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The term "Society of Nations," has long been a familiar
one. Vattel (Preliminaries, Sec. 11) speaks of it as a great
society established by nature between all nations. A syn-
onym is the "community of nations" or "family of na-
tions. ''
Until within a century religion was made a means of nar-
rowing the circle of this society. When Wheaton published
his treatise on the Elements of International Law, he ex-
pressed himself thus (Chap. I, Part I):
"The international law of the civilized, Christian na-
tions of Europe and America, is one thing: and that which
governs the intercourse of the Mohammedan nations of
the East with each other, and with Christians, is another
and a very different thing. The international law of Chris-
tendom began to be fixed about the time of Grotius, when
the combined influence of religion, chivalry, the feudal sys-
tem, and commercial and literary intercourse had blended
together the nations of Europe into one great family.
This law does not merely consist of the principles of natural
justice applied to the conduct of States considered as moral
beings. It may, indeed, have a remote foundation of this
sort; but the immediate visible basis on which the public
law of Europe, and of the American nations which have
sprung from the European stock, has been erected, are the
customs, usages, and conventions observed by that portion
of the human race in their mutual intercourse.
"Many examples of the practical application of this the-
ory will be found in the intercourse actually subsisting be-
tween Turkey and the Barbary States on the one hand, and
the Christian nations of Europe and America on the other;
in which the latter have been sometimes content to take the
law from the Mohammedans, and in others to modify the
Christian code in its application to tfiem."1
The formal entrance of Turkey into the "European fam-
ily" dates from the treaty of Paris in 1856, and Japan,
China, Persia and Siam soon followed to claim and receive
a place in the full society of nations.
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What is the basis of the relations which are or may be
made incident to this Society, as now constituted?
international conduct intended for the observance of all
In general matters of international justice it is the im-
plied consent of every civilized nation. In particular mat-
ters it may be the express consent of every civilized nation:
it may also be something less, namely, the express assent
of the greater part of civilized nations to certain rules of
nations.
It is a rule of universal jurisprudence that he who enjoys
a benefit must assume its incidental burdens. Qui sentit
commodum, sentire debet et onus. Membership in the soci-
ety of nations is a benefit. It therefore carries the corre-
sponding burden.
As Heffter observes: "A nation associating itself with
the general society of nations, thereby recognizes a law
common to all nations by which its international relations
are to be regulated. It cannot violate this law without ex-
posing itself to the danger of incurring the enmity of other
nations, and without exposing to hazard its own existence.
The motive which induces each particular nation to observe
this law depends upon its persuasion that other nations
will observe towards it the same law. The jus gentium is
founded upon reciprocity of will. It has neither lawgiver
nor supreme judge, since independent states acknowledge
no superior human authority. Its organ and regulator is
public opinion: its supreme tribunal is history, which forms
at once the rampart of justice and the Nemesis by whom
injustice is avenged. Its sanction, or the obligation of all
men to respect it, results from the moral order of the uni-
verse, which will not suffer nations and individuals to be
isolated from each other, but constantly tends to unite the
whole family of mankind in one great harmonious society. ' '1
It was exactly this society which met at the Hague in the
Peace Conference of 1907, and met for the first time in the
history of the world. In the closing address of the Presi-
1 The translation of this passage is Wheaton's, in his Elements of In-
ternational Law, Ch. I, Part I.
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dent, M. de Nelidow of Russia, he called special attention
to this fact.
One of the chief guaranties, he said, of the maintenance
of peaceful relations among peoples was an intimate knowl-
edge of their reciprocal interests and needs, and the estab-
lishment of numerous and varied relations between them
tending towards a moral and material solidarity. "The
present Conference," he added, "has accomplished the
greatest progress in this regard that humanity has ever
made. This is the first. time that representatives of all
constituted governments have met for the discussion of
interests which are common to them all, and which tend to
the welfare of all humanity."
Forty-five sovereign States sent delegates to this Con-
gress. But two civilized nations, Costa Rica and Hon-
duras, were unrepresented.2
It recommended favorable action by the constituent
States on several measures of great international impor-
tance.
Of these measures several h' ave been in fact generally
adopted. Before it adjourned it provided, so far as it
could, for another family meeting of the same character.
On motion of M. de Nelidow, the following vote was unani-
mously adopted:
"Finally, the Conference recommends to the powers the
assembly of a third peace conference, which might be held
within a period corresponding to that which has elapsed
since the preceding conference, at a date to be fixed by com-
mon agreement between the Powers, and it calls their atten-
tion to the necessity of preparing the program of this Third
Conference a sufficient time in advance to insure its delib-
erations being conducted with the necessary authority and
expedition.
"In order to attain this object the Conference considers
that it would be very desirable. that, some two years before
the probable date of the meeting, a preparatory committee
should be charged by the Governments with the task of col-
lecting the various proposals to be submitted to the Con-
ference, of ascertaining what subjects are ripe for embodi-
2 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, I, 141, 155.
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ment in an international regulation, and of preparing a pro-
gram which the Governments should decide -upon in suffi-
cient time to enable it to be carefully examined by the coun-
tries interested. This committee should be further intrusted
with the task of proposing a system of organization and
procedure for the Conference itself."
Such a re-assemblage was thus contemplated as likely to
*occur in eight years, that being the interval which had
elapsed between the first and second Hague Conferences.
Had it taken place, and had the International Prize Court
been organized, as hoped for, the course of the present war
would have been materially affected.
The return of peace, whenever it comes, must usher in
a new order of things, in world-regulation. This new order
may conceivably be established by a League of some, but
not all nations, meeting as a particular body. It may con-
ceivably be established by the whole Society of Nations, act-
ing unanimously at a meeting of all nations. It may con-
ceivably be established by the whole Society of Nations by
a majority vote at such a meeting. In one of these three
ways it may be expected that some new rules of interna-
tional conduct will be authoritatively laid down, and means
taken towards securing their universal observance.
The re-convening of the whole Society of Nations, which
met at the Hague in 1907, seems the most logical process to
adopt, in order to put such rules on the firmest foundation.
It will be hard for any of the nations now at war to par-
ticipate in such a Conference with the nations with which
they have been contending. But peace is the normal con-
dition of the world, and history shows that after an inter-
ruption, however violent and prolonged, the belligerent
powers find it less difficult than many had anticipated to
meet on terms of official courtesy, for the discussion of con-
ditions of peace or questions of future intercourse. All
statesmen must keep this historical lesson in view. Lord
Morley, a few years ago, when Secretary of State for India,
pressed it in these striking words upon the attention of
Lord Minto, then Viceroy of India:
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"If I were writing a manual for a statesman, I should
say to him, Remember that in it'e great, high, latitudes of
policy, all is fluid, elastic, mutable; the friend today, the foe
tomorrow; the ally and confederate against your enemy,
suddenly his confederate against you; Russia or France or
Germany or America, one sort of Power this year, quite an-
other sort and in deeply changed relations to you, the year
after. '3'
That the Society of Nations has now for years been weak-
ened by a war which has come to involve all the Great
Powers and many of the lesser ones cannot prevent its rec-
ognition as an enduring force. On the contrary, the war
has given a new impetus to the movement towards bring-
ing all nations ultimately under some closer form of polit-
ical association. That form will naturally shape itself in
terms of reciprocal obligations expressed in a treaty. Ob-
ligations import a duty of performance, either active or
passive. For this performance there must be some security.
That security will certainly be. for one thing, a pledge of
the public faith.
To this might be added:
1. Suspension from the Society of Nations.
2. International outlawry, and economic pressure.
3. The use of the aggregate military and naval force of
the Society of Nations.
Suspension from the Society of Nations would in prac-
tice generally involve international outlawry and economic
pressure. It should and ordinarily would shut out the of-
fending nation from intercourse with the rest of the world.
It would terminate all correspondence whether personal or
commercial. The mails would stop. The cables would be
cut. Wireless telegraphy would be silenced. Imports and
exports would cease.
All this could be effected automatically, as a necessary
consequence of the breach of treaty obligation.
It would be requisite to provide some means for ascer-
taining that such a breach had occurred, and for a public.
3 Morley, Reminiscences, II, 205.
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announcement of it. All the rest could be made to follow
as a legal consequence.
Such a power could be safely entrusted to an interna-
tional court. The Society of Nations, in 1909, at the Hague,
planned two courts of that nature. It would be easier now
to plan one of the particular kind, here considered. It
should be a court with authority to render a judgment
which, be it right or wrong, should be internationally re-
spected. "Every law suit looks to two results: to end a
controversy, and to end it justly; and in the administration
of human government the first is almost as important as
the last. '
How should such a judgment become practically effec-
tive?
Treaties have now the force of law in several countries.
In most free governments they only become effectual when
ratified by legislation. It would be a simple matter to make
it a rule of the Society of Nations that all treaties should
carry a legal obligation. This would make them law as to
all parties in their respective jurisdictions. The courts,
therefore, would be bound to enforce them in favor of any
party who would be injured by their breach. This would
be true as to all courts, including those of every nation,
party to the treaty.
An absolute expulsion from the Society of Nations would
be unnecessary and undesirable. A suspension would have
an equal practical effect. It is believed that, if organized
on such a basis, and thus empowered, the Society of Na-
tions would never need to resort to military or naval
power. Let the possibility of that be reserved as a matter
for future agreement, should suspension and outlawry be
found to be insufficient sanctions. Under any system that
can be imagined for enforcing rules of the Society of Na-
tions by cannon and dreadnoughts there would be practical
difficulties of the gravest character. They should not be
risked until all the remedies which peace can provide have
been tried and found wanting. SIMEON E. BALDWIN.
Yale Law School, September 10, 1918.
4 Hoyt v. Danbury, 69 Conn. 348.
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